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Abstract
This paper presents a sequential model suited to analyze transi-
tions between equilibria. Disequilibrium dynamics are obtained from a
standard monopolistic competition model, by introducing a sequential
structure and reasonable hypotheses about technology, ﬁnance con-
straints, expectation formation, and the wage setting mechanism. The
response to shocks crucially depends on the institutional features of the
economy, and on the monetary policy stance. In particular, some de-
gree of wage stickiness proves necessary to avoid explosive paths. This
feature of the model makes it a good candidate for the reappraisal of
Keynes’ arguments on wages and unemployment.
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11 Introduction
This paper develops a sequential macroeconomic model that allows to study
the characteristics of transitions between equilibria. Most of the times, eco-
nomic analysis is carried out by comparison of steady states (or of regular
growth paths). Transitional (or out-of-steady-state) dynamics are thus ne-
glected because inherently short term phenomena, and because they are
pre-determined from the beginning, and as such not particularly informa-
tive (think for instance of the saddle path adjustment in standard growth
theory). The main point of this paper, instead, is that the transition may
be interesting to the economist because, far from being pre-determined, it is
shaped by the interaction of agent’s behaviour, institutional factors, and en-
vironmental characteristics. Furthermore, during these transitions disequi-
libria appear in at least some markets, and adjustments may have permanent
eﬀects. This approach, while it constitutes no substitute of standard equi-
librium analysis, may complement it and give interesting insights on both
theoretical and empirical grounds, while delivering policy prescriptions.
The baseline model is a standard monopolistic competition model, sim-
ilar to those developed by the New-Keynesian literature (e.g. Woodford
2003), in which I introduce four diﬀerent hypotheses:
• Production takes time, and is often characterized by complementar-
ity rather than substitutability in the factors. The ﬁnal goods sector
uses capital (produced one period earlier) and labour, with a Leontief
production function; further assumptions make this representation an-
alytically equivalent to vertically integrated sector, in which labor is
inputted ﬁrst in construction and then in utilization of productive ca-
pacity (as in Hicks, 1973).
• Agents have bounded rationality, especially when facing complex en-
vironments.
• No variable may move instantaneously. In particular, I reverse the
speed of adjustment of prices and quantities in response to disequi-
libria. As in the early Postkeynesians (Clower, 1965; Leijonhufvud,
1968) or in temporary equilibrium models (Hicks, 1939; Malinvaud,
1977; Benassy, 1982), prices only adjust between periods. In addition,
in this model ex-ante disequilibria (i.e. inconsistency of agent’s plans)
within the period are eliminated by rationing and stock accumulation
rather than by price adjustments.
• Finally, agents are constrained, in their transactions, by ﬁnancial avail-
ability. This sort of cash-in-advancec o n s t r a i n te m e r g e sb e c a u s em a r -
kets open sequentially.
2These hypotheses have all been extensively used in the literature. But,
to the best of my knowledge, never jointly. It is easy to see why they are
relevant when we are interested in the transition between equilibria: each
period begins with state variables determined in the previous one, and with
umbalances that constrain agents in their subsequent decisions. Expecta-
tions and the structure of productive capacity further link the periods in
a sequence. As a consequence, it is impossible to consider each period in
isolation, as for example in the temporary equilibrium literature. A shock
(no matter of what type) disrupts the coordination between agents and be-
tween phases of production that characterizes equilibrium. The “success”
of the subsequent transition lies in the ability of the system in recovering
coordination; and in this respect, both the role of monetary policy and the
institutional wage setting environment prove crucial. In particular, it will
turn out that some degree of wage stickiness may be desirable as a means
for dampening disequilibrium ﬂuctuations.
This paper mainly relates to three streams of literature. The ﬁrst is the
New Keynesian literature that is progressively becoming the reference model,
especially for the analysis of monetary policy (Gali, 2002; Woodford, 2003).
I share with these models the reference to a monopolistic competition sticky
prices environment, even if I have no reference to forward looking Calvo
(1983) pricing; more importantly, my focus is on disequilibrium dynamics,
whereas these papers see ﬂuctuations as equilibrium (technology induced)
phenomena like in the RBC literature. I share with the temporary equilib-
rium literature the ﬁx-price hypothesis, and the possibility of rationing; but
by releasing the hypothesis of full rationality, in my model I have to deal
with the appearance of unsold stocks1, that enrich the model by linking the
periods in a sequence, even if at the price of notable complication. Finally
the stream I am most related to is the Neoaustrian approach, developed by
Hicks (1970, 1973) and Amendola and Gaﬀard (1998). Like them I empha-
size the temporal articulation of production, and the irreversibilities linked
mainly (but not only) to capital accumulation. On the other hand, this pa-
per abandons the Hicksian representation of technology, and substitutes it
with a standard CES production function and time to build. In general, I
make an attempt to provide microfoundations to some of the Neoaustrian
hypotheses, and to relate this type of work to the mainstream literature.
The outline of the paper is as follows: section 2 will lay down the bench-
mark model; the following section will show that each taken in isolation,
complementarity, adaptive behaviour, time to build and a temporary equi-
librium structure do not aﬀect the behaviour of the model other than in the
short run. Section 4, introduces the hypotheses jointly, together with the
1Bounded rationality is not the only reason why stocks could appear. Another one
could be missing information due for example to stochastic rationing (I owe this remark
to Gerd Weinrich).
3intraperiod sequencing of events. Section 5 describes, by means of simu-
lations, the behaviour of the economy when hit by nominal or real shocks.
The analysis focusses in particular on the most appropriate wage regime and
monetary policy stance. Finally, section 6 shows how this model may be ap-
propriate to reappraise Keynes’ intuition about wages and unemployment,
and concludes.
2 The Benchmark Model
Consider an economy in which each of N ﬁnal goods is produced by a mo-
nopolist, using capital and labour hired on perfectly competitive markets.
Money is the numeraire, and is used for transactions.
Consumers The H consumers maximize a Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) utility
function in leisure and in the basket of goods. As their choice is made within
each period, and there is no savings, the time subscript t can be omitted.
max
 ,y
uh =  1−a
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where  h ≡ 1 − ls
h. Assuming that the endowment of labour is 1, total per

















Production The production function and the associated cost function
are CES:
yn =[ ( αlly,n)
ρ +( αkkn)











σ ≡ ρ/(ρ − 1) (3b)
4where pk is the price of capital (that is assumed to completely depreciate at
each period). Notice that all monopolists use the same technology and have
access to the same capital and labour markets. As a consequence, αl,α k,w ,
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In this benchmark case everything is contemporaneous2, so that the solution
to this program boils down to a standard markup equation,
pn = βc0(yn), (5)
where β ≡ b/(b − 1) > 1 is the markup.
Capital Market In the capital market, technology is linear, and per-






This simple formulation, and the assumption that capital markets are al-
ways in equilibrium, de facto make the capital redundant. This is simply a
labour economy, not too diﬀerent from a standard New Keynesian one (e.g.
Woodford, 2003)3. Later on, when adding time to build, we’ll have produc-
tion as a function of dated labour, similarly to what happens in Wicksell
(1898), Hicks (1970, 1973), and Amendola and Gaﬀard (1998).
Equilibrium T h ef a c tt h a ta l lﬁrms utilize the same technology, and
face the same factor prices, allows to focus on a representative ﬁrm omitting
















2In section 4 the recursive structure of the model will allow to focus on two period
problems.




5Capital disappears from the cost function (3b) that becomes
c(y)=Awy
Once we know the equilibrium prices we can determine produced quantity
and proﬁts. The latter are deﬁned as




When the time structure is not relevant, and markets are opened simul-
taneously, proﬁt is always positive, budget constraints do not bind, and all
proﬁts are distributed. As a consequence,
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(10)
After substituting the expressions for w (eq. 7a), and d (eq. 9b), and
with some algebra, we obtain the equilibrium values of y and π
y =
aH






AN (β(1 − a)+a)






Finally, the demand functions for factors determine the quantity of cap-

















that at equilibrium (after substituting the expressions for y, pk, and w) yield
k = α−σ
k γ1−σA−σ aH




N (β(1 − a)+a)
6As a coherence check, notice that N(lk + ly)=Ls.
The model just outlined is totally standard: relative prices, and equilib-
rium quantities are determined exclusively by tastes and technology parame-
ters. As we said, in the benchmark case money only determines the absolute
price level, and serves as a numeraire (as in the classical Walrasian system).
As long as prices are able to adjust in response to shocks, the baseline econ-
omy will always and instantaneously return to equilibrium, once perturbed.
In the next section we will progressively introduce the hypotheses laid down
in the introduction, in order to see how this conclusion changes.
3 Temporary Equilibrium Expectations and Time
to Build
The hypotheses will be introduced in the following order: complementarity
(ρ →− ∞in the production function); temporary equilibrium; adaptive
expectations; and ﬁnally time to build.
3.1 Complementarity
Suppose capital and labour are complementary. The most extreme form of
complementarity is the Leontief production function





This has no eﬀect whatsoever on the model described in section 2, as price
ﬂexibility and the contemporaneous opening of all markets allow equilibrium
to be always immediately established. Complementarity per se does not
change the working of the model, as factors can be freely allocated, and
prices are ﬂexible. It will play a role only later on, when time to build and
forecast errors will imply that some factors are ﬁxed in the short run.
3.2 Temporary Equilibrium Structure
Here we introduce a ﬁrst sequential element, borrowed from the temporary
equilibrium literature (Clower, 1965; Malinvaud, 1977; Benassy, 1982), with
an important diﬀerence to be discussed below when we introduce expecta-
tions. Prices change between periods, and are ﬁxed when markets open and
transactions take place. Thus, we have a ﬁx-price (à la Hicks, 1956) model,
and when plans are not realized equilibrium within the period is attained
by rationing.












7Wage stickiness may be the consequence of many factors, ranging from union
monopoly power to eﬃciency wages, from market incompleteness, to fairness
considerations4. We will take this feature as given, and reﬂected in equation
(16). The parameter κ ≥ 0 summarizes the numerous institutional features
that aﬀect the wage setting mechanism; it will turn out to be crucial in the
following pages.
To keep the structure of the model as simple as possible, we’ll assume
that perfect competition in the capital market continues to ensure the equal-
ity of price and marginal cost through changes in pk,t = wt/γ; and that
monopolists keep setting their prices following the markup rule, pt = Aβwt.
These admittely strong assumptions imply that as long as technology does
not change, relative prices are always constant and at their equilibrium
value. Hence, we are able to focus on absolute rather than relative price
distortions5.
Holding relative prices constant, and focusing on representative con-
sumers and ﬁrms, we can write the model in “reduced” form, with wage
as the only price variable, and in per capita terms6:
ld
t = A(ys


























With respect to the benchmark, the only novelty is the appearance of
stocks in the income of households: If constrained by labour supply, ﬁrms
cumulate undesired money balances (hf), that they will distribute to house-
holds along with proﬁt; otherwise unemployment u appears. Likewise in the
goods market o and hh
t are unsold stocks by ﬁrms, and undesired money
4Here, as in the Calvo pricing scheme commonly used by NK models, the reason why
wages/prices do not change is unexplained (it is simply due to ’institutional’ factors). The
important diﬀerence with Calvo pricing is that in the formulation I chose price setting is
not forward looking.
The literature on causes and consequences of wage stickiness is enormous. For recent
surveys of the theoretical and empirical research, the reader is referred to Campbell,
and Kamlani (1997), Bewley, (1998), and to Howitt’s, (2002) review of a book by Bewley
(1999).
5This is diﬀerent from the following chapters, where relative prices may change. I plan
to relax this feature of the model in future research.
6In fact, all “per ﬁrm” variables are brought to “per consumer” terms, by multiplying
them by N/H.
8balances by households respectively:
h
f
t = wt max(0,ld
t − ls






t = βAwt max(0,yd
t − ys
t) ot =m a x ( 0 ,ys
t − yd
t )
When there is no disequilibrium (and hence no stock accumulation), the
equilibrium quantities of the benchmark case emerge.
As prices do not change within the period, adjustment happens through
rationing; the short side of the market determines the amount exchanged. As
a consequence, agents may own undesired stocks of goods, that are carried
over from one period to the other. We then have




yt =m i n ( ys
t,yd
t)
Real shocks. Thanks to the hypotheses on relative prices, real shocks
do not aﬀect this economy. Suppose for example that αk and/or αl increased,
and as a consequence A decreased to A0 <A ; nothing prevents relative prices
changes, so that
p0 = βA0w<β A w= p (20)
Labour supply and demand would be unchanged, whereas production would
increase (see eqs. 11 and 12).
Nominal shocks. We now introduce a nominal shock, namely an
increase in money supply at time t. Assume that this extra amount is
helicopter-dropped to households, in the form of money balances (so that
hh
t >h h
t−1 =0 ) . As is clear from equations (17) the increase in monetary
income causes an increase of demand for each of the goods, and a corre-



























If wages and prices were free to adapt, w and p would increase to the point
at which the extra money balances were absorbed. There would be no real
eﬀects.
9The unbalance on the labour market causes instead rationing, both in








Only from the following period w and p will increase, at a speed given by
κ (eq. 16). Manipulation of the system (17) allows, together with the wage


































The system can be further reduced, by substituting the third equation into











β (κ +1− a)
(24)
ls = ld =
a
β(1 − a)+a






h]. For κ large enough, (between κm
l and
κo
h, the second position (that coincides with the benchmark equilibrium) is
reached; this can happen monotonically (κ ∈ (κm
l ,κ m
h ]), or with an oscilla-
tory trajectory (κ ∈ (κo
l,κ o
h]). For small values of κ (κ ∈ (0,κ m
l ]) the system
converges to the “bad” equilibrium, in which changes in money balances and
in wages exactly oﬀset each other, so that labour supply and demand are
constant at a disequilibrium level. Finally, for values above κo
h the varia-
tion of the wage is so wide that the system diverges and sooner or later the
economy implodes (some variable goes to 0).
To conclude, a temporary equilibrium structure prevents immediate
jumps to the new equilibrium position. Nevertheless, if prices change to-
wards the absorption of disequilibrium, and if they are not too sticky, the
system eventually converges to the new equilibrium, as is intuitive.
103.3 Adaptive vs Rational Expectations
Up to this point expectation formation has been left in the background. In
fact this was done for a reason, as the role of agents’ beliefs in the adjust-
ment process described above is marginal. If agents are fully rational, they
embed in their decisions both the constraints imposed by the wage setting
mechanism, and the rationing following a disequilibrium. As a consequence,
the sequence of disequilibria following a shock is purely notional, in the
sense that actual demands and supply take into account the constraints,
extra money balances are released only gradually, and markets are always
in equilibrium; the gradual wage change induces the convergence of actual
demand and supply to the equilibrium notional levels. Such a behaviour
is analogous, with the due diﬀerences, to that of standard temporary equi-
librium models (e.g. Benassy, 1982). If agents do not have fully rational
expectations, the diﬀerence between notional and actual quantities disap-
pears, so that the adjustment process is characterized by disequilibria and
accumulation of stocks by rationed agents7.
The only signiﬁcant diﬀerence between adaptive and rational behaviour
is that as the threshold values derived in the appendix depend on initial
conditions, when facing extreme values of κ (below κm
l or above κo
h)f u l l y
rational agents will be able to alter their initial notional demand in order to
change the thresholds and set the economy on a sustainable path. But for
most values of κ the diﬀerence between rational and adaptive behaviour is
not really more than a theoretical curiosum,a si th a sn o te ﬀect on the path
followed by the economy.
3.4 Time to Build
In the preceding paragraphs we showed that in general, adaptive behaviour
and sticky prices only yield temporary disequilibria following a shock. Here
we introduce the last hypothesis - time to build - and we will show that as the
others, it alone does not aﬀect the behaviour of the economy. To analyze the
hypothesis on technology in isolation, we further assume perfect foresight,
so that for any variable x, Et{xt+1} = xt+1. To simplify the exposition,
suppose that the production function is a Cobb-Douglas (ρ =0 ) ,a n dt h a t
the coeﬃcients are such that αl = α and αk =( 1− α). Capital has to be




Cost minimization yields conditional demands that are ’intertemporal’,
7There are not many models in which disequilibria cause stock accumulation. The
interesting exception by Bignami et al (2003), allows for mistakes, actual disequilibria and
rationing, even if in a diﬀerent context with respect to this paper.




































once we consider the equilibrium in the capital market (eqs. 6)
The steady state of this static economy is characterized by xt = xt+1 = x
for each variable. As a consequence, at the equilibrium the economy is like
the benchmark (modiﬁed to take into account the Cobb-Douglas hypothe-
ses):
c(y,w)=α−α (γ(1 − α))











as in eqs. (7), with A = α−α (γ(1 − α))
−(1−α). As a consequence, yπ
and Ls can be calculated as in eqs. (11-12):
y =
aH


















AN (β(1 − a)+a)
= γ(1 − α)
aH









AN (β(1 − a)+a)
= α
aH
N (β(1 − a)+a)
Obviously, nominal shocks do not aﬀect the equilibrium. Prices, free to
adapt, would jump to the new equilibrium level, and quantities would be
unaﬀected. A real shock instead causes a changement in quantities. Consider
the same shock that will be analyzed in section 5.2 below, namely an increase
in a. The new steady state position will be characterized by higher labour
supply and production (this can be checked by substituting a0 >ain eqs.
29). Correspondingly, also capital and labour demand will increase (eq. 30).
Anticipated Shocks Suppose the shock happens at t +1 . If it is





¶−α γ(1 − α)a0H







N (β(1 − a0)+a0)
while given the inherited stock of capital ly,t is at its steady state value.
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where the inequality comes from the fact that a0 >aand α<1.
Unanticipated Shocks If the shock is unanticipated, then the ex-




























Notice that as capital is given in the short run, marginal cost is not any more
independent of y. Starting from demand (as in equation 10, and assuming



































wt−1 (β − 1)a
wt(β(1 − a)+a)
¶
14Notice that the stock of capital disappears from labour demand. We








The equality of labour demand and supply gives
















βa0 + aa0(1 − β)
aβ + aa0(1 − β)
> 1
This section has progressively complicated the simple model presented
in section 2. We showed that neither complementarity nor quantity adjust-
ment within the period, nor time to build really aﬀect the basic message
of the model, i.e. that prices change to absorb shocks. We further argued
that adaptive or rational expectations make no essential diﬀerence. None
of the hypotheses we laid down in the introduction, if taken in isolation,
has signiﬁcant eﬀects on the benchmark model. At the very worst, as in the
case of sticky prices, adjustment to the new equilibrium that follows a shock
takes some time. The next section will put all these hypotheses together,
and it will show that in that case these conclusions may drastically change.
We’ll be able to show that whether agents commit systematic mistakes or
not, or whether capital and labour are complements or substitutes, will cru-
cially aﬀect the path followed by the economy. We’ll also show that in such
an economy some surprising results about the desirability of wage ﬂexibility
may emerge.
4T h e S e q u e n c e
The time to build hypothesis can be rephrased in more general terms with
reference to the CES:





where it−1 is investment in the previous period.
15Assuming that markets open sequentially (credit, then labour, and ﬁnally
goods), is a simple way to introduce a cash in advance constraint: wages
have to be paid before goods are sold, and hence in disequilibrium ﬁrms may
have a positive demand for external ﬁnancing.8
Expectations Expectations may be backward looking, or take into
account the steady state properties of the system: at the beginning of period
t entrepreneurs expect demand in the following period, and unemployment
















t−1|t−1 +( 1− λ)ut−1
´
+( 1− φ)0
where φ is an indicator function taking value 1 if expectations are backward
looking, and λ denotes the (lack of) propensity to change expectations based
on past experience.
Desired quantities Given wages, and via the markup (eq. 5) relative
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ˆ ıt = α−σ
k (γA)1−σy∗
t+1|t
with hats denoting desired quantities9. Two important things are worth
mentioning: the ﬁrst is that investment ˆ ı incorporates the “time to build”
assumption, in the sense that capital has to be bought at time t for utilization
at time t +1 . The second feature of eq. 43 is that the monopolist takes
into account all expected income, i.e. wage by employed workers, aggregate
proﬁts distributed in the previous period (to all H households), and also,
if any, involuntary money hoardings (Hh =
P
H hh) derived by rationing in
the previous period. Notice also that he takes the aggregate price level as
given (at the last known level, Pt−1).
8Notice that in the section above this sequential opening would have had no eﬀect at
all. Cash in advance constraints play a role only in disequilibrium.
9Notice that the unemployment rate reduces demand (via household income). This
formulation is de facto identical to the scaling down of demand due to constrained labour
supply that I use in the appendix
16Desired production is determined subtracting from desired quantity un-
sold stocks carried on from last period (ot−1), and taking into account the
constraint of capital availability:









In other words, after taking into account stocks, agents check whether the
capital inherited from last period is suﬃcient to carry on desired production;
if it is not the case (kt < ˆ kt), desired production has to be scaled down.
Labour demand is determined by the needs of the two sectors. In the
capital sector, perfect competition guarantees that supply matches desired
demand, so that as said before, investment is nothing but demand for “dated
labour” (eq. 13b)
ˆ ly,t = A1−σα−σ
l ˆ qt
(45)
ˆ lk,t =ˆ ıt/γ
Once we know labour demand, we may ﬁnally determine the desired wage
fund, and the consequent demand for money.
Cash-in-advance, budget constraints, and the market for credit
In the baseline model, contemporanous opening of all markets, and the mo-
nopolistic competition structure, guaranteed that the ﬁrm’s budget con-
straints was always satisﬁed. Once we develop the sequential structure of
the model, the cash-in-advance constraint may be binding, and it may cause
a positive demand for money. As we anticipated above, when the labour
market opens ﬁrms have to pay wages with all available cash, i.e. with rev-
enues from previous periods, and with external funds. The reason is that
wages have to be paid in advance, and that as we’ll see, outside the steady
state internal funds may not be suﬃcient. Money demand may then be
written as the diﬀerence between the wage fund and internal resources.
Fd
t = wt(ˆ Ly,t + ˆ Lk,t) − (Rt−1 + H
f
t−1 − Πt−1) (46)
where R and Π are aggregate revenues and distributed proﬁts respectively,
and Hf denotes involuntary monetary hoardings by ﬁrms (see eq. 51 below).
Equation 46 embeds the cash-in-advance constraint: the ﬁrm system needs
additional funds for whatever of the wage pool it cannot ﬁnance out of
internal resources.10
10This model leaves the ambiguity of F (money or credit?) unresolved. In fact, money
supply is simple outside money (not repaid), whereas money demand is more like demand
17The behavior of monetary authoritiesis not explicitly modeled. We sim-
ply assume that the monetary policy authority follows a rule that weights
money demand, inﬂation, and steady state behaviour.
Fs
t = µ[ξFd






The parameter µ gives the willingness to accommodate demand. ξ denotes
the degree of foresight of the central bank; with ξ =1we have perfect fore-
sight, whereas ξ =0implies that the central bank only observes demand
with a lag. Finally, ψ denotes the weight given to inﬂation. Broadly speak-
ing, a “Friedman” rule would have µ =0 , while a “Taylor” rule would imply
positive ψ and µ.
Households’ demand and supply. On the household side, we have
















Hwt + Πt−1 + Ht−1
wt
4.1 Market outcome and rationing
Once the “notional demands” are formulated, the markets open sequentially.
The ﬁrst market to open is the credit market, where we have
Ft =m i n ( Fd
t ,Fs
t ) (49)
If money demand is rationed, the entrepreneurs will not be able to demand











t ≡ Ly,t + Lk,t. We assume proportional rationing between the y
and k markets. If supply is rationed, we assume that the excess money is
distributed to households (see below). Notice that ﬁrms rationed by credit
constraints, by scaling down labour demand to make it consistent with ﬁ-
nancial availability, take into account monetary policy when forming their
for credit (but for it to be credit, we would need to keep track of repayments adding term
like −(1+r)Ft−1 in the budget constraint). The reason why the ambiguity is not resolved
is that here I am more interested in observing how money demand emerges, and what are
the eﬀects of liquidity constraints on investment and income. In future research I plan
to develop the ﬁnancial market. An interesting attempt in this direction in a standard
Hicksian setting is contained in Attar and Campioni (2003).
18demand in the other markets. Thanks to the fact that the ﬁnancial market
opens ﬁrst, its constraints are embedded in the agent’s plans similarly to
the standard temporary equilibrium literature.
The second market to open is the labour market. Once again, eﬀective
employment (and consequently unemployment) is given by the short side
rule












t = wt max(0,L d
t − Ls
t)
If constrained by labour supply, ﬁrms cumulate undesired money balances
that they will distribute to households together with proﬁts. The total pool
of employed workers produces capital and goods:
qt =[ ( αlly,t)ρ +( αk¯ kt)ρ]1/ρ
it = γlk,t (52)
ys
t = qt + ot−1




, with j = y,k, are the constrained
quantities.
After equilibrium in the labour market is attained, wages are paid, and
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The ﬁnal market to consider is the goods one, where we have
















Notice that households carry stocks both because they were rationed in the
goods market, and because the excess supply of money was distributed to
them.
19This marks the end of the period. The economy enters the follow-
i n gp e r i o dw i t has t o c ko fc a p i t a lKt+1 = Nit that will be available to
ﬁrms for production. Other state variables are the stocks of unsold goods
(o), nondesired money balances (Hh), and proﬁts distributed to households
(Πt = Rt + H
f
t − wtLt).
Stocks on one side enter into the decision process (via expectations);
and on the other contribute to shape the system of constraints faced by
agents in the following period. This is a crucial diﬀerence with respect to
the temporary equilibrium literature, in which each period was de facto
considered in isolation. Here the stocks carried from one period to the other
shape a sequence11 of periods that it is impossible to analyze separately.
The model outlined above has complex disequilibrium dynamics, that
make an analytical solution impossible to ﬁnd. The next section will there-
fore rely on simulations to trace the path followed by the economy.
5T h e S i m u l a t i o n s
This section presents some basic results of the sequential model I described.
I will analyze both nominal and real shocks, and describe how diﬀerent hy-
potheses (in particular regarding wage regimes and monetary policy) aﬀect
the ﬁnal outcome of the disequilibrium path followed by the economy. In all
cases, the economy is initially in steady state, and is perturbed by a shock
that creates a disequilibrium in one or more markets.
The relevant parameters in the model are not many: the degree of sub-
stitutability between inputs (ρ); the responsiveness of wages to disequilibria
in the labour market (κ); the parameters governing expectations (φ and ξ);
and ﬁnally, the monetary policy stance (µ and ψ)12. A thorough analysis
would nevertheless require too many cases to be analyzed, so that I opted for
some time series examples, complemented by a Monte Carlo investigation of
the parameter space. The parameter values are drawn randomly within the
relevant range, and the response of the economy to the shock is analyzed by
looking at the ﬁnal level of production, and to its variance over the run.
5.1 Nominal Shocks
Suppose that at time t =1 0the stock of money increases by 10%. This
extra money adds to the nominal income of consumers, and will imply an
increase in the demand for goods and leisure. In the benchmark model,
the instantaneous price adjustment would immediately absorb the nominal
11“Via expectations, and in the attempt to correct the imbalances between demand
and supply, a ‘constraints-decisions-constraints’ sequence sets in, that results in an out-
of-equilibrium process” (Amendola and Gaﬀard, 1998, p. 27).
12The other parameters are: αk = αl =0 .5,γ=1 6 ,a =0 .7,b=2H =1 0 0 0 ,N=1 0 ,
λ =0 .5. All the simulations where ran in FORTRAN. The code is available upon request.
20excess demand, and quantities will be unaﬀected. Introduce now the sequen-


















































































Figure 1: Nominal Shock. Linear technology (ρ =1 ) , ﬂexible prices (κ =
0.5) accommodating monetary policy (µ =1 )and perfect foresight (φ =0 ,
ξ =1 ) .
The system quickly goes back to equilibrium (ﬁgure 1). Production initially
drops, because the increase in leisure demand implies a shortage in labour
supply. Notice that if production could take place with capital built in the
same period, then we would observe an increase of actual production in the
short run. But in this case, the labour shortage cannot be compensated by
the use of more capital (still to be built), even if the technology allows for
the substitution. In the following periods, the increase of wages triggered
by the excess demand for labour helps reabsorb the disequilibrium, and the
nominal shock has no long term eﬀects.
Increasing the degree of complementarity (ρ →− ∞ ) does not change
the qualitative behaviour of the system, but makes the initial disequilib-
rium deeper, and the recovery longer, as ﬁgure 2 shows, by comparing the
deviation of supply from its steady state value in the three cases of linear
(ρ =1 ) , Cobb-Douglas (ρ =0 )and Leontief (ρ = −∞) technology. The
standard deviation of supply increases with complementarity, whereas the
mean decreases. This result conﬁrms and extends the ﬁndings of section 3.2:
even with time to build and complementarity, if agents do not form their
expectations backward looking, shocks are reabsorbed.
The next step is to introduce the hypothesis of backward looking behav-
iour. We assume that agents form their expectations based on past demand
behaviour (φ =1in eq. 42); and that the monetary authority is only able
to observe demand for credit with a lag (ξ =0in eq. 47). We are interested
the behaviour of the economy under diﬀerent wage regimes and monetary
policy rules. In ﬁgure 3 I plotted the ratio of production over the steady


















































ρ = − ∞
Figure 2: Nominal Shock. Speed of convergence with diﬀerent levels of
complementarity. Flexible prices (κ =0 .5), accommodating monetary policy

























































































κ = 0.5  µ=0
κ = 0  µ = 1
κ = 0  µ = 0
κ = 0.5  µ=1
Figure 3: Monetary policy and wage regimes. Nominal shock with perfect
complementarity (ρ = −∞) and backward looking behaviour (φ =1 ,ξ=0 ) .
and monetary policy stance (µ =0or µ =1 ) . These four extreme cases give
some interesting insights: ﬁrst a shock, - even a positive and nominal one
- triggers an adjustment process that sets the economy on a permanently
lower production level. The reason has to be found in the diﬃculty to re-
cover coordination, lost after the shock. In particular, the initial labour
supply shortage imposes a constraint on both investment and production
decisions that, contrary to the previous cases, now cumulates because of
the interaction of production and decision lags. The system settles on a
new steady state with no involuntary unemployment, but lower labour force
participation (ﬁgure 4 depicts the case µ =0and κ =0 .5). On the other
hand, the excess of monetary means causes a permanent excess demand in
the goods market that is never reabsorbed, as the driving force in the price










































































Figure 4: Nominal shock. Goods and labour markets in the case of tight
monetary policy (µ =0 )and ﬂexible wages (κ =0 .5).
The second conclusion we can derive from the analysis of ﬁgure 3 is that
wage ﬂexibility may play a positive role in the response to the shock, but
that this role depends crucially on the interaction with monetary policy. In
fact, an accommodating monetary policy, coupled with wage changes, may
set the economy on an explosive path: agents react to wage changes altering
their investment and production behaviour, and consequently the demand
for external ﬁnancing. If these ﬂuctuations are excessive, a tight monetary
policy may dampen them, whereas by accommodating they may be further
enhanced. However, ranking the four cases by mean and standard deviation,
we notice that money creation may partially do the job of wage changes, so
that if κ =0an accommodating monetary policy (µ =1 )results in a higher
mean and lower variance of output. Notice that in the analysis of section 3.2
there was no room for monetary policy. The importance of credit is clearly
linked to the sequential nature of the model and to investment.
To summarize, the analysis of the time series gives some important in-
sights. The ﬁrst is that the sequential structure of the economy does not
matter per se, in the sense that well informed agents, not facing credit con-
straints, are able to reabsorb a monetary shock pretty rapidly. The loss
of coordination entailed by shock is only temporary and the economy goes
back to the original steady state path.
The second result is that once we introduce intertemporal complemen-
tarities in the production process and backward looking behaviour, even a
nominal shock has permanent eﬀects. Coordination, if the system is suﬃ-
ciently ﬂexible may be recovered; but, as a consequence of the disequilibrium
path taken by the economy, this will generally happen at a level of output dif-
ferent from the original one. The impossibility of instantaneous adjustment
to changes in the environment triggers a sequence of constrained decisions,
and has permanent eﬀects on the structure of the economy.
23Finally, we showed that the interaction of monetary policy and wage
regimes plays a crucial role. Decisions by non fully rational agents entail
mistakes that may cumulate; so that if on one side some ﬂexibility in wages
and/or in credit creation is necessary in order to allow the reabsorption of
the shock, on the other side, if excessive, it may actually amplify the eﬀects
of bad decisions, and push the economy on unsustainable paths.
The next step is to verify whether the intuition that comes from the
analysis of time series is robust to changes in the parameters. I set up a
Monte Carlo experiment consisting in the random draw of nine parameters13,
and in a run of the economy, recording the ratio between ﬁnal and initial
supply, and the standard deviation of supply over the run. The parameters
























Figure 5: Monte Carlo for nominal shocks. Final/steady state level (right)
and standard error (left) of production as a function of the wage regime and
monetary policy stance.
aﬀect the ﬁnal outcome of each simulation in a strongly nonlinear way. In
order to sort out their eﬀect I regressed the two variables over the nine para-
meters including powers and cross terms to account for nonlinearities. The
full results of the regressions are reported in the appendix. Here I’ll focus
on the two parameters I am mainly interested in, the wage regime κ and
the monetary policy stance µ. Figure 5 reports the approximating polyno-
mials in µ and κ for s and for its standard error. It shows that increasing
wage ﬂexibility has positive eﬀects both in terms of reduced variability (left
panel) and ﬁnal level of production (right panel). But this is true only up
t oap o i n t .F o rt o oh i g hv a l u e so fκ, further increases of the wage reaction
coeﬃcient increase volatility, and reduce the ﬁnal level of output (notice
that when analyzing time series, the ﬂexible wage case had κ =0 .5).T h i s
conclusion is even more evident from the left panel of ﬁgure 6, where I plot-
t e d( t h ep o s i t i v ev a l u e so f )t h ed e r i v a t i v eo ft h es surface with respect to
13ρ ∈ [−35,1),κ∈ (0,1),µ∈ (0,1),λ∈ (0,1),ξ∈ (0,1),φ∈ {0,1},α k ∈ [0.1,0.9]
(with αl =1− αk),N∈ [2,99],ψ∈ (0,1).
24changes in κ.. For values higher than κ ' 0.6 the derivative is almost always


























Figure 6: Monte Carlo for nominal shocks. Derivative of ﬁnal supply with
respect to wage regime (left) and monetary policy stance (right)
negative, meaning that increasing ﬂexibility will lead to a lower ﬁnal level of
output. Notice ﬁnally that this is true for almost any level of µ.T h er e a s o n
for this result is that when adjustment is not instantaneous (both in the
agent’s decision processes and in the technological structure), and actions
are irreversible, a frictionless system may become extremely unstable, while
what are generally seen as ‘market imperfections’ contribute to smooth the
eﬀects of actions based on wrong beliefs, and hence help maintaining the
system viable. In a world characterized by adaptive behaviours and by a
temporally articulated production structure, the conventional wisdom is re-
versed: some degree of market imperfection may be a factor of stability of
the system rather than an obstacle on the way to fully optimal equilibria. I
will return on this result when discussing Keynes’ view on unemployment.
For monetary policy the results are less clear-cut. The right panel of
ﬁgure 6 shows changes in s when µ changes, again cutting the ﬁgure at
the zero level. The only clear conclusion is that a more accommodating
monetary policy (increasing µ) is more eﬀective for low levels of κ, conﬁrming
what we said about some degree of substitutability between ﬂexibility given
by the wage regime and by monetary policy.
To conclude, the systematic investigation over the parameter space con-
ﬁrms the conclusions reached earlier, namely that some degree of wage ﬂex-
ibility is beneﬁcial in recovering equilibrium after a nominal shock hits the
economy; and furthermore, that accommodating monetary policy is desir-
able especially when wages cannot change to reabsorb the shock. The Monte
Carlo experiment gives an additional information, i.e. that excessive wage
variability may be harmful. We explained this result with the smoothing
role that market imperfections play in this model.
255.2 Real Shocks
In this section we consider a change of tastes; speciﬁcally, suppose that con-
sumer switch their preferences from leisure to the goods, increasing labour
supply accordingly14. In section 3.2, lacking the intertemporal dimension













































































Figure 7: Real shock. Shift in preferences from leisure to goods demand.
Linear technology (ρ =1 ) , ﬂexible prices (κ =0 .5) accommodating mone-
tary policy (µ =1 )and perfect foresight (φ =0 ,ξ=1 ) .
Here time to build induces some real eﬀects. Nevertheless, ﬁgure 7 shows
that when no complementarities exist, and agents are perfectly informed,
the shock is almost immediately reabsorbed. As this was the case for nom-
inal shocks as well (see ﬁgure 1), a ﬁrst result is that in a perfectly smooth































































































κ = 0.5  µ=0
κ = 0  µ = 0
κ = 0  µ = 1
κ = 0.5  µ=1
Figure 8: Monetary policy and wage regimes. Real shock with perfect com-
plementarity (ρ = −∞) and backward looking behaviour (φ =1 ,ξ=0 ) .
14We assume that at time 10 the parameter a changes from 0.7 to 0.75.
26Comparing ﬁgure 8 with ﬁgure 3, on the other hand, we notice that the
nature of the shock becomes relevant once we introduce irreversibilities in the
production process and in technology. The most immediate consideration is
that in the case of a real shock monetary policy is crucial. The equilibrium
position following a shift of preferences towards more of the goods implies a
higher level of production and hence of installed productive capacity. This
is why a tight monetary policy, by constraining investment, is detrimental,
and pushes the system on an explosive path. The role of wage ﬂexibility is
more controversial; on one hand, it allows a faster recovery. On the other, it
is characterized by higher variability, and by a larger initial recession; this










































Figure 9: Comparison of wage regimes. Real shock with accommodating
monetary policy (µ =1 )and backward looking behaviour (φ =1 ,ξ=0 ) .
in the two cases of ﬁxed and ﬂexible wages, with accommodating monetary
policy.
The next step is to verify the robustness of these results. The strategy
for the investigation of the parameter space is the same as in the section
on nominal shocks, and the results are reported in ﬁgure 10. The left panel
shows that the standard error of aggregate supply is increasing in κ, and
decreasing in µ. This means that both more ﬂexible wages and a tighter
monetary policy increase output variability. The right panel depicts the
ratio between supply at time t = 200 and the equilibrium level. The ratio
is strongly increasing in µ, meaning that a more accommodating monetary
policy helps the system converge to the new equilibrium. The eﬀect of larger
κ on ﬁnal supply is less evident.
The Monte Carlo analysis conﬁrms that real shocks are faster reabsorbed
when monetary policy is accommodating, and the ﬁnancial constraint does
n o tp l a yar o l e .A tt h es a m et i m e ,m o r eﬂexible wages do increase output
variability, whereas the eﬀects on ﬁnal output are only marginally positive15.
15This is also determined by the length of the run (200 periods). If we had a shorter


























Figure 10: Monte Carlo for real shocks. Final/steady state level (right) and
standard error (left) of production as a function of the wage regime and
monetary policy stance.
The analysis of nominal and real shocks has highlighted some interest-
ing features of the sequential economy described above. The interplay of
reasonable assumptions (on technology, and on price and expectation for-
mation) produces results that seem robust to the parameter speciﬁcation.
In particular, in such a framework both an accommodating monetary policy
(as a way of limiting ﬁnancial constraints), and some degree of wage rigidity
(as a way of dampening ﬂuctuations, once wages are not market clearing)
appeared as crucial.
The next chapter will show how a sequential model similar in spirit to
this one may shed light on an empirical puzzle on technical progress and
productivity growth (the so called ‘productivity paradox’). The present
chapter will instead be concluded by some notes on Keynes’ discussion of
unemployment and wage regimes, and on its relation with out-of-equilibrium
modelling.
6 Wage Flexibility and Disequilibrium Dynamics.
The General Theory Reconsidered
The scope of this section is to analyze Keynes’ arguments about wages and
unemployment, and to show that the sequential model presented in sections
2a n d4o ﬀers a suitable framework for his analysis. In other words, this
paper may be seen as a contribution to the literature claiming that Keynes’
theory may not be reduced to a special (ﬁx price and hence short run) case of
the Neoclassical model as claimed by the IS-LM approach. The IS-LM is an
period, the eﬀect of κ would be more evident, because recovery is faster with more ﬂexible
wages.
28equilibrium construct, in which markets are complete, and the price vector
conveys all the information necessary to fully coordinate agent’s decisions.
In this framework, unemployment can only stem from nominal rigidities in
the relevant market, namely the one for labour.
Leijonhufvud (1968), is the ﬁrst author to oppose the standard textbook
interpretation of Keynes, and to read the General Theory as an attempt to
introduce problems of coordination in the standard Walrasian framework.
He argues that Keynes’ main innovation lies in the method, which is the
attempt to see unemployment as a disequilibrium phenomenon linked to the
adjustment process following an exogenous disturbance. Furthermore, “the
Keynesian [system] adjusts primarily by way of real income movements”
(Leijonhufvud, 1968, p.51). The main reason for this shift of focus from
prices to quantities in the adjustment process lies in the refusal of the costless
role of the auctioneer. Price adjustments require information that is costly
and lengthy to acquire. This implies that adjustment is not instantaneous,
so that the Walrasian hypothesis of trade only happening at equilibrium
prices has to be dropped. The result of trading at disequilibrium prices
is the appearance of constraints which hamper the realization of agents’
plans16. Hence “Realized transaction quantities enter as arguments of the
excess demand function in addition to prices” (Leijonhufvud, 1968, p.56).
Coordination problems arise in particular in the market for savings and
investment, where agents with diﬀerent time horizons interact. “Financial
markets are manifestly incapable of providing for the consistency of long-
term production and consumption plans” (Leijonhufvud, 1968, p. 276).
The reason is that expected future values of the interest rate play a role
even more important than its current value, and may induce speculative
behaviour. Trade then takes place at a false price, at which ex ante savings
and investment are not equated. It is therefore income that has to change
in order to restore this equality. The conclusion, according to Leijonhufvud,
is obvious: “It was Keynes’ position that it is the failure of the incomplete
market mechanism to reconcile the implied values of forward demand and
supplies [...] that is the source of the trouble. Unemployment of labor and
other resources is a derivative phenomenon” (1968, p. 276).
If the ‘source of the trouble’ does not lie in the labour market, whose
disequilibrium is only a ‘derivative phenomenon’, the hypothesis of ﬁxed
wages that stirred so much controversy acquires a very precise meaning.
Keynes writes that “if money-wages were to fall without limit whenever
there was a tendency for less than full employment, [...] there would be
16The realization of the agent’s plans is actually constrained by the trades that they
are able to do and by the sequence of sales and purchases. Clower (1965) introduced
the distinction between ‘notional’ and ‘eﬀective’ demand, that only coincide when trade
happens at equilibrium prices. Out of equilibrium the standard budget constraint of
consumers is replaced by a liquidity (later known as cash-in-advance) constraint, and by
an income constraint.
29no resting place below full employment until either the rate of interest was
incapable of falling further, or wages were zero. In fact, we must have some
factor, the value of which in terms of money is, if not ﬁxed, at least sticky,
to give us any stability of values in a monetary system” (Keynes, 1936, p.
303). Keynes reverses the common wisdom on wage rigidity, that in his
framework becomes a necessary institutional feature to avoid the implosion
of the system rather than a source of disequilibrium.
Leijonhufvud’s interpretation of the General Theory subtracts it to the
fate of a special case of the Walrasian model. Furthermore, it underlines the
attempt to bring to the foreground the problems that (the lack of) coordina-
tion poses. This intuition, dynamic in nature, is nevertheless constrained by
the choice of an equilibrium framework, and has hence to rely on the persis-
tence of ‘wrong’ prices to explain unemployment17. And this has contributed
weakening the argument; after all, what would prevent, in the medium-to-
long run, the creation of a new market able to coordinate investment and
consumption decisions? Or the design of some institutional mechanism able
to lift the economy from a low activity equilibrium?
The focus of this paper on disequilibrium dynamics allows instead to
highlight two features of trading at disequilibrium prices that are men-
tioned but not developed by Keynes and Leijonhufvud: the appearance of
constraints that at each moment in time aﬀect the agent’s plans, and the
sequence of suboptimal choices triggered by these constraints. Figures 11
and 12 show how, in my model, a shock may trigger a cumulative deﬂation-
ary process, as originally argued by Keynes. The system is now perturbed
increasing by 5% the number of workers (an increase of H).U n e m p l o y m e n t
could be reabsorbed by increasing productive capacity and employment to
the new equilibrium level, and in fact this is what happens in the stan-
dard case. On the other hand, with complementarity in technology, and
irreversibilities in the decision and production process, the shock has per-
manent eﬀects. Figure 11 shows that with ﬁxed wages unemployment is
not reabsorbed, even when the ﬁnancial constraint is not binding (µ =1 ) .
The complementarity between capital and labour in the production process
constrains agents’ choices, and production only increases with one period
lag. The loss of coordination implies that wage payment is not synchro-
nized with production and goods availability, so that when workers are paid
17The intuition that the right framework for this discussion is dynamic has kept reap-
pearing. Drèze has recently tackled the issue within a general equilibrium model with
rationing, concluding that “it is not obvious at all that price or wage adjustments sus-
ceptible of removing ineﬃciencies caused by price distortions would also operate in the
right direction, or with any eﬀectiveness, to circumvent coordination failures...[the heart
of the problem is ] ...the movement from one supply-constrained equilibrium to another
as a topic in dynamics, inviting the study of adjustment processes deﬁned over prices
(...), quantities, price expectations and plans” (1997, p.1753). Similar points are made by
































































Figure 11: Increase in Λ with ﬁxed wages (κ =0 ) . Perfect complementarity
(ρ = −∞), accommodating monetary policy (µ =1 ) , and backward looking
behaviour (φ =1 ,ξ=0 ) .
(during construction) they ﬁnd themselves with undesired money balances;
and the following period, when production is available we observe excess
supply and unsold stocks, that are put back on the market in the following
period. The system settles down to an underemployment equilibrium, in





































































Figure 12: Increase in H with ﬂexible wages (κ =0 .5). Perfect complemen-
tarity (ρ = −∞), accommodating monetary policy (µ =1 ) , and backward
looking behaviour (φ =1 ,ξ=0 ) .
Figure 12 shows furthermore that allowing for wage variability does not
help reabsorb unemployment. Rather, as argued by Keynes, it sets the
system on a ﬂuctuating, explosive path. The reason is that wage decreases
reduce the wage bill, and hence total demand. Production keeps following
with a lag, so that at each period more and more stocks cumulate, and the
system explodes.
Notice an important point here. In this model relative prices (the real
31wage) are constant, and at the equilibrium value (given by technology alone,
see eq. 7) so that in principle the purchasing power does not change, and the
eﬀect described by Keynes should not take place. What in fact determined
the implosion of ﬁgure 12 is the lack of intertemporal coordination, further
aggravated by wage changes. In the following chapters, when we’ll allow for
real wages to change, these eﬀects will be even more evident. But it is worth
noticing that when the system lacks intertemporal coordination, changes in
nominal wages may be harmful even when real wages take their equilibrium
value18.
The model presented in this paper proves to be an useful tool for an-
alyzing transitions between equilibria in economies characterized by irre-
versibilities and complementarities. In many respects it gives insights that
are similar to those of standard Hicksian constructs, as the ones used in the
following chapters; as such, it constitutes a bridge between that stream of
literature and more standard macroeconomic models.
In this paper the model was shown to be useful for reframing the theoret-
ical debate on wage ﬂexibility that followed the publication of the General
Theory. The focus on the properties of transitions, and on the conditions to
be met for guaranteeing their viability,a l l o wt ou s ei tt oi n v e s t i g a t ee m p i r i -
cal puzzles, as in the next chapter, or more in general to propose a diﬀerent
perspective on economic policy (Amendola and Gaﬀard, 1998).
Further research along these lines should investigate the consequences of
releasing the price setting mechanism, for example allowing variable mark-
ups, and consequently changes in real wages. A Further complication of
the baseline model, that would most probably have the eﬀect of smoothing
ﬂuctuations, is the introduction of stock management by ﬁrms, that would
work in the direction of at least partially releasing the constraints. It would
also be interesting the introduction of heterogeneity (in technology, in ﬁrm
size, in consumer preferences).
18Amendola, Gaﬀard and Saraceno (2001), develop the argument on real and nominal
wage ﬂexibility in Keynes and in an Hicksian framework.
32Appendix
A Convergence to Equilibrium with Fixed Prices
This appendix shows how to derive the threshold values derived in section
3.2. As in the text, let’s start with the case of an excess demand of labour
and goods, derived for example by nominal transfers. We need to show for
what values of κ the economy converges, in the sense that an increase of
wages succeeds in absorbing the extra money balances. The system 17 is
reproduced here, with minor diﬀerences.
ls
t =






































a + β (1 − a)
a
¶
−1 > 0 (56)
so that the steady state of the system is deﬁned by x =0 . Labour supply
may be rewritten as
ls




















with Rt = ld
t(1 + β) − 2ls
t
Monotone convergence requires two conditions: The ﬁr s ti st h a tt h ea b s o l u t e
value of x decreases over time; the second is that its values keeps the same

















































Then, substituting the values for y and rearranging we obtain
a
























































































To summarize, for values of κ ∈ (κm
l ,κ m
h ), the system converges monoton-




1) until it reaches what we called the "bad" equilibrium. For values above
κm
h the variation of wages is such that the system abandons the portion of
the plane characterized by excess demand of labour. This does not mean
34that it will diverge though, as it may well be the case that convergence is
oscillatory.








< 1 with xt < 0
In words, the absolute value of excess demand/supply must decrease,
and the sign must be diﬀerent at successive t0s. Regarding condition a)
we have the same starting system that we had for monotone convergence
(system 55); but now condition b) of eqs 58 is of course reversed. It is then

















We only need to show that the oscillatory trajectory does not explode, i.e.
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The following four tables report the complete results of the regressions that
are behind ﬁgures 5, 6 and 10. To obtain the values in the tables, the
following algorithm was followed19. Starting from a set of regressors (the
nine variables, plus their squares, with the exception of the indicator φ),
new variables were created (powers and cross products) sequentially. Each
new variable was regressed on the set of other regressors, and dropped if its
R2 was larger than 0.99 (this to avoid multicollinearity). Otherwise, it was
added to the set of regressors, and ran on the endogenous variable. If its
Student t was larger than 2, it was kept, otherwise dropped. Notice that this
19The algorithm was implemented in Eviews. The help of Giovanni Marini is gratefully
aknowledged.
35algorithm does not guarantee a ”path independent” selection of regressors,
because the order in which variables that may be collinear are extracted
matters. This is why that set of regressors was further altered by doing
joint signiﬁcance tests, and adding other variables deemed signiﬁcant; this
arbitrary second round allowed to signiﬁcantly increase the R2 of the regres-
sion, or at least to keep it almost unchanged while reducing signiﬁcantly the
number of regressors.
Notice ﬁnally that the benchmark value of production has in fact two
diﬀerent meanings when referring to nominal shocks (table 1), and when
referring to real ones (table 3). In the latter case, the shock alters the
equilibrium values of labour supply and production, so that yss 6= y0 is the
new equilibrium value. In the case of nominal shocks, on the other hand,
the shock does not alter the fundamentals of the economy, so that the new
equilibrium value of production is the initial one.
36Dependent Variable: y200/y0
Name Coeﬀ.S t u d e n t t Name Coeﬀ.S t u d e n t t
C 0.782 76.88 κ3 ∗ µ4 13.772 3.56
ρ 0.000 3.58 κ2 ∗ µ -2.693 -3.77
ρ2 -0.005 -6.23 κ2 ∗ µ2 11.595 4.45
ρ3 -0.011 -2.18 κ2 ∗ µ4 -8.360 -3.16
κ 4.815 13.99 κ ∗ µ2 -1.249 -1.98
κ2 -51.831 -11.23 κ ∗ µ3 -1.232 -1.85
κ3 283.112 9.75 κ ∗ µ4 2.192 2.60
κ4 -862.961 -8.82 κ3 ∗ ξ2 2.261 5.33
κ5 1536.5 8.18 κ3 ∗ ξ3 -1.901 -4.92
κ6 -1587.8 -7.70 κ2 ∗ ξ2 -3.284 -5.27
κ7 881.857 7.33 κ2 ∗ ξ3 2.759 4.88
κ8 -203.463 -7.03 κ ∗ ξ2 1.145 5.19
µ 0.272 4.87 κ ∗ ξ3 -0.962 -4.86
µ2 -1.421 -4.23 κ4 ∗ φ -0.898 -3.19
µ3 3.180 3.70 κ3 ∗ φ 1.876 3.15
µ4 -3.014 -3.14 κ2 ∗ φ -1.301 -3.10
µ5 1.023 2.63 κ ∗ φ 0.331 3.05
κ4 ∗ µ -3.611 -3.78 φ -0.020 -2.67
κ4 ∗ µ2 10.596 4.82 ψ 0.010 2.18
κ4 ∗ µ4 -7.088 -3.74 µ ∗ ξ 0.016 2.22
κ3 ∗ µ 6.058 3.77 ξ ∗ ψ -0.012 -1.85




Table 1: Coeﬃcients and Student t for nominal shocks (ﬁg. 5)
37Dependent Variable: s.e.(y)
Name Coeﬀ.S t u d e n t t Name Coeﬀ.S t u d e n t t
C 1.468 23.01 κ3 ∗ µ4 -81.516 -4.76
ρ 0.095 8.18 κ2 ∗ µ -14.535 -6.50
ρ2 0.020 5.70 κ2 ∗ µ3 -28.064 -3.80
ρ3 0.002 4.56 κ2 ∗ µ4 31.769 4.49
ρ4 0.000 3.95 κ ∗ µ 6.107 6.05
ρ5 0.000 3.58 κ ∗ µ2 -2.637 -2.19
ρ6 0.000 3.31 κ3 ∗ ξ2 -20.838 -6.68
κ -26.907 -10.62 κ3 ∗ ξ3 18.178 6.29
κ2 327.377 9.47 κ2 ∗ ξ -2.994 -2.16
κ3 -1933.7 -8.80 κ2 ∗ ξ2 36.048 7.15
κ4 6231.0 8.35 κ2 ∗ ξ3 -29.767 -7.10
κ5 -11571.6 -8.02 κ ∗ ξ 2.490 2.29
κ6 12349.1 7.76 κ ∗ ξ2 -14.636 -5.53
κ7 -7028.1 -7.55 κ ∗ ξ3 11.490 6.32
κ8 1651.921 7.36 κ3 ∗ φ 0.377 6.36
µ2 1.524 3.88 κ ∗ φ -0.424 -6.10
µ3 -1.398 -3.83 φ 0.142 5.05
κ4 ∗ µ3 -53.310 -5.23 ψ -0.033 -2.64
κ4 ∗ µ4 49.907 4.63 µ ∗ ξ -0.868 -5.28
κ3 ∗ µ 9.192 6.00 (µ ∗ ξ)2 0.395 2.78





Table 2: Coeﬃcients and Student t for nominal shocks (ﬁgures 5 and 6)
38Dependent Variable: y200/ys.s.
Name Coeﬀ. Student t Name Coeﬀ.S t u d e n t t
C 0.423 18.397 ξ 0.040 5.668
κ 2.610 59.450 φ 0.202 27.776
κ2 -12.590 -34.895 (κ ∗ ξ)3 0.227 5.156
κ3 83.501 24.224 (κ ∗ ξ)6 -0.308 -5.770
κ4 -275.163 -18.941 (φ ∗ µ)3 -0.027 -3.637
κ5 433.656 13.511 (ρ ∗ κ)5 -0.000 -3.397
κ6 -324.690 -9.432 κ ∗ µ ∗ ξ -0.054 -2.255
κ7 93.272 3.088 κ ∗ φ -0.820 -34.271
µ 0.960 38.804 κ ∗ ξ2 -0.116 -6.859
µ2 -16.059 -29.630 λ2 ∗ φ -0.063 -2.600
µ3 -9.991 -25.390 µ ∗ ξ ∗ ψ 0.065 5.308
µ4 23.864 22.732 µ2 ∗ ξ 0.028 2.559
µ5 -3.993 -16.295 φ ∗ κ ∗ µ -0.028 -2.639
µ6 5.969 19.317 φ ∗ κ ∗ ξ -0.098 -4.850
κ4 ∗ µ 47.534 2.027 φ ∗ κ2 0.781 32.839
(κ ∗ µ)4 -114.826 -6.378 φ ∗ λ 0.062 3.598
κ4 ∗ µ2 -166.253 -3.507 φ ∗ µ 0.053 5.190
κ4 ∗ µ3 234.235 2.059 φ ∗ ξ 0.031 3.512
κ3 ∗ µ -116.033 -2.714 ψ ∗ µ2 -0.045 -3.696
κ3 ∗ µ2 412.187 2.068 ψ2 ∗ µ 0.028 3.103
κ ∗ µ -28.271 -17.282 ρ 0.007 8.764
κ ∗ µ2 100.120 12.805 ρ ∗ κ -0.010 -7.670
κ3 ∗ µ4 286.848 3.048 ρ ∗ κ2 0.006 6.566
(κ ∗ µ)3 -585.930 -4.161 ρ2 0.000 4.540
κ ∗ µ3 -142.474 -17.818 ρ2 ∗ κ -0.000 -5.373
(κ ∗ µ)2 -341.607 -2.545 ρ3 0.000 2.938
κ2 ∗ µ 0.538 14.823 ρ4 0.000 2.242
κ ∗ µ4 68.839 3.331 ρ6 ∗ κ8 -0.000 -2.115
κ2 ∗ µ4 -237.883 -6.596 ξ ∗ φ ∗ ψ -0.011 -2.256




Table 3: Coeﬃcients and Student t for real shocks (ﬁg. 10)
39Dependent Variable: s.e.(y)
Name Coeﬀ. Student t Name Coeﬀ.S t u d e n t t
C 1.843114 35.27427 φ ∗ µ 1.407003 0.915133
κ 1.043664 22.8387 φ ∗ µ3 -2.9395 -2.67632
κ2 0.779735 16.19126 φ ∗ µ2 3.788424 1.766719
κ3 0.000 11.74137 φ ∗ κ ∗ ξ -2.20523 -16.8097
κ4 -0.104 -10.7467 φ ∗ λ -1.04755 -4.23422
κ10 -0.93319 -8.39693 φ ∗ λ3 0.90208 7.181311
µ2 -0.24699 -7.61641 κ ∗ ξ 2.487553 6.35296
µ3 -0.6012 -6.48404 (κ ∗ ξ)3 -2.04345 -6.72128
µ8 -1.6355 -5.06244 (κ ∗ ξ)6 1.181511 6.711969
κ ∗ µ 0.842994 8.907181 κ ∗ µ ∗ ξ 2.561427 4.422727
κ2 ∗ µ -0.39988 -1.78418 φ ∗ κ ∗ µ -31.548 -7.4445
κ3 ∗ µ -1.59281 -3.88906 (φ ∗ κ ∗ µ)2 107.072 6.201877
κ6 ∗ µ7 0.194012 4.116608 φ -9.78159 -19.1736
ρ 0.298574 11.20279 φ ∗ κ 133.2162 12.50388
ρ2 0.055976 9.374639 φ ∗ κ2 -996.314 -8.43181
ρ3 0.004605 8.308802 φ ∗ κ4 -12405 -6.74207
ρ5 2.52E-06 7.041266 λ 0.100906 2.405695
ρ4 0.000174 7.58546 µ ∗ λ -0.19302 -2.83616
ρ9 -1.26E-13 -5.64162 µ ∗ ξ -3.14526 -8.53234





Table 4: Coeﬃcients and Student t for real shocks (ﬁg. 10)
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